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Capital Punishment Jurisprudence 
of the United States Supreme Court 
and the Impact of 
Tuilaepa v. California 
on that Evolution* 
By choosing to make capital punishment a sentencing option, 
state legislatures assume the responsibility of creating a capital 
punishment sentencing scheme. This ensures that the death penalty 
is imposed in a manner that comports with the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. In 1972, due to the protection afforded by the Eighth 
Amendment, the United States Supreme Court began to analyze how 
much discretion was granted to the sentencing bodies responsible 
for determining whether a capital offender is sentenced to death or 
life imprisonment. This began an evolution in this country s capital 
punishment jurisprudence which has continued through the present 
term of the Supreme Court. The focus of each stage of this 
evolution has been the aggravating factor and the manner in which 
it guides the discretion of the capital punishment sentencing bodies, 
thus ensuring that the death penalty is imposed in a constitutional 
* Special thanks to Justice Richard Ruffin.an for his thought provoking 
suggestions, as well as his valuable insight and guidance. Thank you also to Katherine 
Hunsaker for her constant support and understanding. 
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manner. This Comment argues that in its 1994 decision ofTuilaepa 
v. California, the Supreme Court began a new era in capital 
punishment jurisprudence. There now exists a two-step process for 
sentencing a capital offender to death. In addition, requirements 
placed upon an aggravating factor depend upon the step in which 
the factor is being considered. 
INTRODUCTION 
The capital punishment jurisprudence of the United States Supreme 
Court is based upon the principles and ideas embodied in the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 Long ago, however, the 
Court announced that the protection provided by the Cruel.and Unusual 
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment is not susceptible to 
precise de:finition.2 Therefore, the Court has struggled to develop a 
definitive standard that establishes what must be included in a constitu-
tional capital punishment sentencing scheme. As a result, what is 
constitutionally required of a capital punishment statute has undergone 
a dramatic evolution over the past twenty-five years.3 
This evolution began during the 1970's when the Supreme Court 
announced that the death penalty is a very unique form of punishment, 
1. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. 
amend. VIII ( emphasis added). 
By using the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Eighth 
Amendment was construed to restrict the states' authority to inflict punishment in 
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); see also Robinson v. 
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring). In pertinent part, the Four-
teenth Amendment provides, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
2. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 258 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); see 
also Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878) (stating that "[d]ifficulty would 
attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which 
provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted"). 
3. This Comment will only discuss the death penalty as a punishment for the 
crime of murder. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the death penalty is 
a "grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is 
therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment." Coker 
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). In the Coker decision, the Supreme Court implied 
that no state may invoke the death penalty as a punishment for a crime in which no life 
is taken. See Michael W. Combs, The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment: 
Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Judicial Control, 7 S.U. L. REV. at 1, 33 (1980). However, 
some states still have statutes which designate crimes other than murder as capital 
offenses, such as aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, treason, skyjacking, and some 
drug offenses. See Raymond J. Pascucci, Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the 
Pursuit of Fairness and Consistency, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1129, 1222-24 (1984). The 
federal government also has a statute which designates a crime other than murder as a 
capital offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (punishing espionage as a capital offense). 
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in both its severity and irrevocability.4 As such, it requires a corre-
spondingly unique method of determining whether it is the appropriate 
punishment in each case in which it is imposed.5 Before this evolution 
began, the death penalty was assumed to be a constitutionally permissi-
ble form of punishment. The only constitutional challenges to the death 
penalty were to the means by which the offender was put to death.6 
However, as a result of its announcement, the Court began to closely 
scrutinize the capital punishment statutes which were employed by the 
states. In particular, the Court examined the amount of guidance and 
discretion the states provided to their sentencing authority when directing 
the authority to determine which offenders would be sentenced to death 
and which to life imprisonment. This examination began the dramatic 
evolution of the Court's capital punishment jurisprudence and left the 
states unclear as to what was required of a constitutional death penalty 
statute. 
By 1978, the decisions of the Supreme Court had begun to develop a 
framework that provided the states with some greatly needed direction. 
The guiding principle of these decisions was that a capital punishment 
sentencing scheme must provide a "meaningful basis for distinguishing 
the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many 
cases in which it is not."7 Through several convolute<l; decisions,8 the 
Supreme Court suggested that a state must adhere to this guiding 
principle by directing its sentencing authority to consider, in each case, 
the circumstances that justified executing the offender 9 and those that 
4. Furman, 408 U.S. at 287 (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., 
concurring); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976). 
5. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (explaining that "death 
is· qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long ... [and] 
[b ]ecause of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need 
for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific 
case"). 
6. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 282-84 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
7. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 313); see also Lockett 
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 
428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson, 428 U.S. 280; Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 
(1976). 
8. Furman v. Georgia (1972) was a 5-4 decision with the Justices writing nine 
separate opinions totaling 233 pages. Furman, 408 U.S. at 238-470. The "1976 cases" 
(Gregg v. Georgia, Proffitt v. Florida, Jurek v. Texas, Woodson v. North Carolina and 
Roberts v. Louisiana) were all sharply divided decisions which totaled 211 pages. 
9. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197-98. 
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might mitigate against such a sentence.10 This was in contrast to the 
previous practices of permitting the sentencing authority to arbitrarily 
sentence the offender to death11 or mandating it to do so if the offender 
is found guilty of any enumerated offense.12 With this rough frame-
work in place, state legislatures began to modify their death penalty 
statutes in an effort to comply with the Supreme Court's ambiguous 
mandates. 13 Gradually, many of these state statutes were brought 
before the Supreme Court. The Court has slowly provided more and 
more guidance as the evolution of the constitutional death penalty statute 
has continued. 
Presently, thirty-eight states have death penalty statutes.14 Although 
the details of each state's statute differ, they all generally employ some 
form of guided discretion. A guided discretion statute is one in which 
the sentencing authority's15 discretion to impose the death penalty is 
10. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604. 
11. For a discussion of this practice, see Furman, 408 U.S. at 256 (Douglas, J., 
concurring); id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
12. For a discussion of this practice, see Woodson, 428 U.S. 280, 301-05 (1976). 
13. For example, California's death penalty statute was either ruled unconstitu-
tional or changed dramatically six times during the 1970's alone. See John W. Poulos, 
Capital Punishment, the Legal Process, and the Emergence of the Lucas Court in 
California, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV 157, 169-97 (1990). 
First, in February of 1972, in People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 
Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972), the California Supreme Court held that the death penalty was 
invalid per se under the California Constitution. Poulos, supra, at 169-70. Second, in 
November of 1972, Proposition 17 was passed as part of the general ballot and the 
California Constitution was amended to make the death penalty constitutionally valid. 
Id. at 171. Third, in 1973, the California Legislature enacted a mandatory death penalty 
statute following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Furman. Id. at 172-73. 
Fourth, in 1976, in Rockwell v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 420, 556 P.2d 1101, 134 Cal. 
Rptr. 650 (1976), the California Supreme Court held that California's mandatory death 
penalty was unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Poulos, 
supra, at 176-77. Fifth, in 1977, the California Legislature enacted another death penalty 
statute in an attempt to comply with the decisions of the California and U.S. Supreme 
Courts. Id. at 177-83. Finally, in 1978, Proposition 7 was passed during the general 
election, making dramatic changes to the 1977 death penalty statute and making 
California's death penalty law much "stronger." Id. at 183-95. 
14. See Patricia Mitchell, Executions In America, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 1994, at 
A5 (chart). The article cited actually indicates that there are only 37 states with the 
death penalty, however, in March of 1995, New York added a death penalty statute to 
its books which went into effect on September 1, 1995. 1995 N.Y. Laws ch. 1, §§ 20, 
38 (codified at N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 60.06). 
15. A majority of states provide for jury sentencing in capital cases, however, 
some allow the judge to be the sentencing authority or to override the recommendation 
of an advisory jury. Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 14 
(1980); see, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-703(B) (1989 & Supp. 1994) (making the 
court alone the sentencing authority); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West 1985) 
(granting the judge final authority to impose or withhold the death sentence notwithstan-
ding the jury's recommendation); see also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 463 (1984) 
(stating that 30 of the 37 death penalty jurisdictions make the jury the ultimate 
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guided by its consideration of the factors in the case that aggravate in 
favor of the death penalty16 and those that mitigate against it.17 Under 
a guided discretion statute, aggravating factors perform a constitutionally 
essential function in that the sentencing authority is required to find at 
least one aggravating factor present in a case before the death penalty is 
even an option. Due to the central role that aggravating factors play in 
a constitutional death penalty statute, it is critical that the aggravating 
factors utilized are defined in a constitutionally permissible fashion and 
perform the necessary function. 
In the recent United States Supreme Court decision of Tuilaepa v. 
California, 18 the Court for the first time suggested that the amount of 
precision with which an aggravating factor must be defined, as well as 
the exact function an aggravating factor must perform, depends upon the 
stage of the capital sentencing process in which the factor is utilized. 19 
This Comment will trace the evolution of the requirements which the 
Constitution places upon the process utilized to sentence an offender to 
death and analyze the impact of the Court's decision in Tuilaepa upon 
sentencing authority with three of the remaining seven allowing a judge to override a 
jury's recommendation of life imprisonment). In_Spaziano, the Supreme Court ruled that 
jury sentencing is not constitutionally required. Id. at 464. 
16. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193-95 (1976). These factors are tenned 
"aggravating factors," or aggravating circumstances, and are those facts about the capital 
offender's particular record or the offense which warrant the offender being sentenced 
to death instead of life imprisonment. They include such things as a previous murder 
conviction, the murder being committed to prevent a lawful arrest, or the murder being 
committed for pecuniary gain. Typically, the factors are referred to as statutory 
aggravating factors, or circumstances, because they are enumerated in a state's death 
penalty statute. See infra note 63 for a discussion of whether it is a constitutional 
requirement that only statutory aggravating factors, as opposed to non-statutory 
aggravating factors, are utilized to sentence a capital offender to death. 
17. These factors are tenned "mitigating factors," or mitigating circumstances, and 
are "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the 
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Lockett 
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,604 (1978). Elements typically used as mitigating factors include 
age, lack of prior criminal activity, and extreme mental deficiency. 
18. 114 S. Ct. 2630 (1994). · 
19. Id. at 2634. In Tuilaepa, the Court, for the first time, stated that the process 
of sentencing a capital offender to death is comprised of two steps. During the first step, 
or the eligibility stage, the group of all offenders convicted of murder is narrowed down 
to a smaller group of all offenders who are deemed to be eligible for the death penalty 
based upon the.facts of their particular case. During the second step, or the selection 
stage, the individuals that will receive the death penalty are selected from the group of 
capital offenders that were deemed to be eligible for that punishment. Id. at 2634-35; 
see also supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text. 
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that evolution. Section I will provide important background information 
regarding the standards used by the Court to decide which punishments 
comport with the Eighth Amendment's mandates. Section II will trace 
the evolution of the death penalty statute in the decisions of the Supreme 
Court. The emergence of guided discretion statutes as the preferred 
means of satisfying the requirements of the Eighth Amendment will then 
be discussed. Section III will focus specifically on the role of aggravat-
ing factors in a guided discretion statute, as well as the requirement that 
an aggravating factor not be unconstitutionally vague. Section IV will 
discuss and analyze the Tuilaepa decision. Section V will discuss the 
effect that the Tuilaepa decision has had on the evolution of the 
constitutional requirements placed upon a capital punishment statute. 
Finally, Section VI will provide a brief conclusion on the evolutionary 
nature of the requirements of a constitutional death penalty statute. 
I. MEANING OF "NOR CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS"20 
Most of the early decisions of the Supreme Court which contemplated 
the protection provided by the Eighth Amendment simply assumed that 
if a punishment was similar to one that was deemed to be cruel and 
unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted, then it was itself 
cruel and unusual.21 Therefore, in 1890, the Court adopted the circular 
standard that if a punishment was "manifestly cruel and unusual" it fell 
within the prohibitions of the Eighth Amendment.22 Twenty years 
later, in Weems v. · United States, 23 the Supreme Court renounced this 
antiquated standard when it recognized that "a principle to be vital must 
be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it 
birth."24 Thus, in Weems the Court recognized that the standard which 
should be used to decide if a punishment is indeed cruel and unusual 
must be a fluid standard that has the ability to change with the times. 
In Trop v. Dulles,25 the Court again renounced the "manifestly cruel 
and unusual" standard and recognized the evolutionary nature of the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. It acknowledged that the Clause 
20. For a more thorough examination of the meaning of the phrase "nor cruel and 
unusual punishment" see Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Inflicted": The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969). See also Alan I. Bigel, 
William H. Rehnquist on Capital Punishment, 17 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 729, 734-36 
(1991); Therese M. Roy, Note, Solem v. Helm: The Court's Continued Struggle to 
Define Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 21 CAL. W. L. REV. 590, 592-602 (1985). 
21. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 264 (1972). 
22. Id. at 264-65 (quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890)). 
23. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
24. Id. at 373. 
25. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
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"must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society."26 Accordingly, the Court 
announced that "[t]he basic concept underlying the [Clause] is nothing 
less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, 
the [Clause] stands to assure that this power be exercised within the 
limits of civilized standards."27 The Court thereby interpreted the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment as prohibiting 
the infliction of any punishment that is beneath human dignity. 28 The 
standard to be used to determine which punishments are beneath human 
dignity is that established by contemporary societal values. 29 
While a standard based on contemporary societal values may seem to 
be as vague and imprecise as the Clause itself, the Court's application 
of this standard has provided meaningful guidance and made this 
standard a viable one. Chief Justice Burger noted that "in a democracy 
the legislative judgment is presumed to embody the basic standards of 
decency prevailing in the society. "30 The Court has expanded on this 
proposition and now determines contemporary societal values by 
examining "objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a 
given sanction."31 First among these indicia are the decisions of state 
legislatures. "[L]egislative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining" 
contemporary societal values. 32 Second, the sentencing decisions of 
juries are examined. The jury "is a significant and reliable objective 
index of contemporary values because it is so directly involved" in the 
process of sentencing an offender to death.33 Through this two-part 
examination, the Court ensures that a particular punishment comports 
with contemporary societal values and thus with the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 
26. Id. at 100-01. See also Weems, 217 U.S. at 378 (stating that the Clause "may 
be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning 
as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice"). 
27. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100. 
28. Id.; see also Weems, 217 U.S. at 378; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 
666 (1962). 
29. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. 
30. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 384 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); cf 
id. at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that "[t]he acceptability of a severe 
punishment is measured, not by its availability, for it might become so offensive to 
society as never to be inflicted, but by its use"). 
31. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). 
32. Id. at 175. 
33. Id. at 181. 
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION OF THE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
STATUTE 
A. The Fall of Unfettered Sentencing Discretion 
Prior to 1972, there was no need to apply the guarantee of the 
contemporary societal values standard to the death penalty because death 
was simply assumed to be a constitutionally permissible form of 
punishment. That assumption·was not at that point challenged.34 As 
a result, the state legislatures were given carte blanche to adopt any 
death penalty statute which they saw fit. Taking advantage of this 
unlimited authority, the legislatures granted their sentencing authorities 
unrestrained and unguided discretion in determining which capital 
offenders received the death penalty and which received life imprison-
ment. 35 
However, in 1972, this practice of giving the sentencing authority 
unfettered discretion was challenged in the landmark case of Furman v. 
Georgia.36 In Furman, the Supreme Court heard the appeal of three 
defendants who had been sentenced to death, two of whom were 
sentenced under the Georgia capital punishment sentencing scheme and 
one under the Texas scheme.37 The Court granted certiorari to 
determine whether ''the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty 
in [these cases] constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 
34. Furman, 408 U.S. at 285 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 241 (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (stating that "[i]t has been assumed in our decisions that punishment by 
death is not cruel, unless the manner of execution can be said to be inhuman and 
barbarous" (construing In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)). 
35. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE§ 190.1 (West 1970). 
At the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted in 1791, all of the states had 
mandatory death penalty statutes; if the offender was convicted of an enumerated 
offense, he was automatically sentenced to death. However, juries began to react 
unfavorably to the mandatory nature of these statutes and often refused to convict an 
offender of the enumerated offenses. In an effort to eliminate this problem, the 
legislatures made several modifications to their death penalty statutes (including splitting 
the offense of murder into first and second degree murder), but none of these efforts 
were successful. Consequently, in Tennessee in 1838, the mandatory death penalty 
statute was abandoned in favor of a discretionary death penalty statute which permitted 
the jury ( or sentencing authority) to choose between the death penalty and life imprison-
ment, based upon whichever criterion it chose. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U.S. 280, 289-95 (1976) (relating the history of mandatory death penalty statutes in the 
United States). 
36. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
37. Id. at 239. One of the Georgia defendants was sentenced to death based upon 
his conviction for the crime of first-degree murder. The other Georgia defendant and 
the Texas defendant were sentenced to death based upon their convictions for the crime 
ofrape. Id. 
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the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments"38 Not surprisingly, the case 
resulted in a sharply divided five to four decision by the Court with nine 
separate opinions being written.39 Two of the concurring Justices 
adopted the view that the death penalty was per se unconstitutional and 
violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in all cases.40 
However, the other three concurring Justices were unwilling to hold that 
the death penalty was per se unconstitutional.41 Instead, these three 
Justices ruled strictly on the constitutionality of the defendants' death 
sentences, holding that the procedures used to impose these particular 
sentences were constitutionally deficient.42 The view espoused by these 
three concurrences is generally considered to be the holding of 
Furman.43 
Although no one rationale can be cited as the basis for the Court's 
decision in Furman,44 there is at least one principle which is common 
38. Id. (alteration in original). 
39. Id. at 238-470. 
40. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 360 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
Justices Brennan and Marshall continued to advocate that the death penalty was per se 
unconstitutional throughout the remainder of their terms on the Supreme Court. See, 
e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 904-05 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Barclay 
v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 974-91 (1983) (Marshall, J. dissenting); McCleskey v. Kemp, 
481 U.S. 279, 320-45 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 
356, 366 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 309-
24 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 755-56 (1990) 
(Brennan, J., concurring). 
41. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, 
J., concurring); id. at 310 (White, J., concurring). 
42. Id. at 239-40 (per curiam). 
43. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 
586, 600 (1978). 
44. Justice Douglas held that the death penalty was applied in a discriminatory 
fashion and thus violated the defendants' right of equal protection, which he believed to 
be "implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments." Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 
(Douglas, J., concurring). 
Justice Brennan held that the death penalty was "inflicted arbitrarily" and that because 
it violated the four factors that he had developed in order to determine whether a given 
punishment was cruel and unusual it was unconstitutional per se. Id. at 305 (Brennan, 
J., concurring). 
Justice Stewart held that the death penalty was applied in a "capricious" and "random" 
manner and therefore violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 309-10 
(Stewart, J., concurring). 
Justice White held that the death penalty statutes before the Court were unconstitution-
al because they were applied so infrequently that they actually undermined the social 
purposes (incapacitation, deterrence, and retribution) that justified their enactment. Id. 
at 311-13 (White, J., concurring). 
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to all five concurring opinions. That principle is that the broad and 
unguided discretion which the states gave to their sentencing authorities 
prior to Furman allowed the death penalty to be imposed in an arbitrary 
and capricious manner. 45 The concurring opinions all held that "the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a 
sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to 
be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed."46 Thus, what Furman was 
construed to prohibit was the unguided and unrestrained exercise of 
discretion in choosing which capital offenders received the death penalty 
and which received life imprisonment. . 
The holding of Furman was expressly confined to the Georgia and 
Texas death penalty statutes which were at issue in the consolidated 
cases before the Supreme Court.47 In reality though, Furman implicitly 
rendered all death penalty statutes then in existence unconstitutional 
because each of those statutes provided the particular sentencing 
authority the same broad and unguided discretion that the Georgia and 
Texas statutes provided to their sentencing authorities.48 The Court's 
Furman decision, however, failed to provide the states with any 
meaningful guidance with regard to the procedures that might make a 
capital punishment statute constitutional. The significance and the 
impact of the Furman decision therefore blindly cast the United States 
into a new era of capital punishment jurisprudence. 
B. The State Legislatures' Responses to Furman 
In response to the vague pronouncements of Furman, many state 
legislatures sought to rewrite death penalty statutes which had been 
Justice Marshall held that the death penalty was per se unconstitutional because it "is 
morally unacceptable to the people of the United States at this time in their history." 
Id. at 360 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
45. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (explaining that "Furman held that [the death 
penalty] could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk 
that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner''). 
46. Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart compared 
the chances of being sentenced to death to that of being struck by lightning. "These 
death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is 
cruel and unusual." Id. at 309. 
47. See id. at 239-40 (per curiam). 
48. Id. at 417 (Powell, J. dissenting). At the time of the Furman decision, 40 
states and the District of Columbia had death penalty statutes and 39 of these statutes 
were rendered µnconstitutional by the Court's decision. The only statute surviving the 
Furman decision was that of Rhode Island (which provided for the death penalty for the 
offense of murder by a life term prisoner) because it was a mandatory statute and the 
Furman decision did not speak to mandatory statutes. Furthermore, the Furman decision 
"remove[d] the death sentences previously imposed on some 600 persons awaiting 
punishment in state and federal prisons throughout the country." Id. 
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effectively, although not expressly, ruled unconstitutional by the decision 
in that case.49 However, it was unclear whether Furman s prohibition 
of unguided and unchanneled sentencing discretion required the 
elimination of all sentencing discretion or just that the discretion be 
guided. Consequently, the state legislatures were left to sift through 
Furman 's nine separate opinions in their efforts to create a constitution-
ally valid capital punishment sentencing scheme. 
As a result of this ambiguity, two very different schools of thought 
emerged, each with its own distinct interpretation of Furman.50 The 
majority view interpreted Furman as holding that the Constitution did 
not permit a capital sentencing authority to have any discretion at all. 
This school of thought asserted that the statute which was most likely to 
withstand a constitutional attack was one that imposed a mandatory 
death .sentence if the offender was convicted of an enumerated offense. 
Twenty-two states adopted this view and removed all discretion from the 
capital punishment sentencing process by adopting mandatory death 
penalty statutes.51 
The minority view focused on the type and amount of discretion that 
was afforded the sentencing authorities in the pre-Furman death penalty 
statutes. This school of thought asserted that the unguided nature of the 
discretion produced the constitutional flaw rather than the simple fact 
that the sentencing authority was granted the discretion to make its own 
decision. Consequently, this minority believed that as long as the 
sentencing authorities' discretion was suitably guided, a death penalty 
statute would withstand a constitutional attack. Twelve states adopted 
this view and enacted statutes which were modeled after the American 
Law Institute's Model Penal Code Section 210.6.52 Section 210.6 set 
49. Between June 29, 1972, the date on which Furman was decided, and July 2, 
1976, the date the next significant capital punishment decision was announced by the 
Supreme Court, 44 states redrafted their death penalty statutes in an effort to comply 
with the mandates of Furman. See Poulos, supra note 13, at 172. 
50. See Poulos, supra note 13, at 172. See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
180 (1976). 
51. See Poulos, supra note 13, at I 72. For examples of these mandatory death 
penalty statutes see 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 1201, § I; 1973 La. Acts no. 109, § I; Act 
of Sept. 24, 1973, ch. 719, 1973 Cal. Stat. 1297. 
52. See Poulos, supra note 13, at 172. 
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forth a guided discretion statute which utilized aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances to guide the sentencing authority's discretion.53 
C. The "1976 Cases" and the Emergence of Guided Discretion 
By 1976, several of the statutes which had been enacted in response 
to Furman had been the subject of constitutional attacks, and thus, had 
begun to work their way through the nation's court system. By July 2, 
1976, five of these statutes had made their way to the Supreme Court.54 
On that date, the Court announced five death penalty decisions which 
have become known collectively as the "'76 Cases".55 These five cases 
provided the Supreme Court with its first opportunity to clarify its 
enigmatic Furman decision and to identify constitutionally acceptable 
capital punishment sentencing procedures. 
The first of the '"76 Cases" was Gregg v. Georgia.56 In Gregg, the 
Court examined the Georgia state legislature's use of a guided discretion 
statute57 in an effort to comply with the dictates of Furman. However, 
before it could do so, the Court had to clarify what in fact the Furman 
decision required of a capital punishment sentencing scheme. The Court 
clarified its Furman decision by stating that "Furman mandates that 
where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as 
the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, 
that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize 
the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."58 Using this as the 
Furman standard, the Court held that Georgia's use of a guided 
discretion statute did in fact comply with the dictates of Furman. In 
particular, the Court stated that Georgia's use of aggravating factors 
53. For a list of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances used by the Model 
Penal Code, see Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193 n.44. 
54. Of the five statutes which were challenged on that date, two were guided 
discretion statutes, see Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162-66; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247-
50 (1976), two were mandatory death penalty statutes, see Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280, 286 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 329-31 (1976), and the 
final statute could not be categorized as either, see Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268-69 
(1976). 
55. The "'76 cases" are: Gregg, 428 U.S. 153; Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242; Jurek, 428 
U.S. 262; Woodson, 428 U.S. 280; Roberts, 428 U.S. 325. 
56. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
57. The statute challenged in Gregg required that the sentencing authority find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the ten statutory aggravating factors exists 
before the sentencing authority was even permitted to consider the death penalty. Then, 
once the sentencing authority had found at least one statutory aggravating factor, it was 
directed to consider all evidence in aggravation and mitigation of the sentence of death 
when deciding if the particular capital offender will be sentenced to death. Gregg, 428 
U.S. at 164-66. 
58. Id. at 189. 
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guided and channeled the sentencing authority's discretion, and thereby 
controlled, if not eliminated, the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the 
death penalty which existed prior to Furman.59 In Gregg, the Court 
went on to announce that the concerns expressed in Furman could best 
be "met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing 
authority is given adequate information and guidance . . . and provided 
with standards to guide its' use of the information."60 The Court's 
decision in Gregg represents the first expressed, recognition of what 
makes a constitutional death penalty statute and suggests that a guided 
discretion statute which utilizes aggravating factors may well be the 
preferred form of capital punishment statute. 
Following Gregg, the Court next decided Proffitt v. Florida.61 In 
Proffitt, the Court used much of the same rationale that it employed in 
Gregg to hold that the Florida guided discretion statute's use of 
aggravating factors sufficiently guided and channeled the sentencing 
authority's discretion.62 What the Court's decision in Proffitt added to 
the Gregg decision was a statement of what the Constitution did not 
require: 
While the various factors to be considered by the sentencing authorities do not 
have numerical weights assigned to them, the requirements of Furman are 
satisfied when the sentencing authority's discretion is guided and channeled by 
requiring examination of specific factors that argue in favor of or against 
imposition of the death penalty thus eliminating total arbitrariness and 
capriciousness in its imposition.6 
59. Id. at 206-07. 
60. Id. at 195. 
61. 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
62. Id. at 259-60. 
63. Id. at 258. Proffitt is an important decision for another reason. In a footnote, 
the Court suggests the possibility that a death sentence based entirely upon non-statutory 
aggravating factors may be constitutionally flawed. Id. at 250 n.8. However, after 
raising this issue the Court leaves it unresolved by relying upon Florida's statutory 
language, which expressly limits the aggravating factors to those enumerated in the 
statute. Id. 
The Court returned to the issue of the constitutionality of using non-statutory 
aggravating factors to sentence an offender to death in Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 
(1983). The Court stated that its above-referenced statement in Proffitt questioned the 
constitutionality of a sentence based entirely upon non-statutory aggravating factors. 
Barclay, 463 U.S. at 956-57. However, the Court held that its statement in Proffitt saw 
no constitutional defect in a death sentence that is based upon both statutory and non-
statutory aggravating factors. The Court then concluded that although the Florida death 
penalty statute expressly prohibits the use of non-statutory aggravating factors, the 
Constitution places no such requirement upon a death penalty statute. Id. Therefore the 
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Thus, the Court's decision in Proffitt reinforces the proposition that a 
guided discretion statute provides a constitutionally adequate, if not the 
preferred, response to the concerns addressed by the Court in Furman. 
In Jurek v. Texas,64 the third of the "'76 Cases" to be decided, the 
Court examined a statute that did not expressly use aggravating factors 
in an attempt to comply with the dictates of Furman.65 However, in 
holding that the Texas statute did satisfy the dictates of Furman, the 
Court construed the statute as if it had used aggravating factors. The 
Court stated that "[b ]y narrowing its definition of capital murder, Texas 
has essentially said that there must be at least one statutory aggravating 
circumstance in a first-degree murder case before a death sentence may 
even be considered."66 Through this holding, the Court further 
confirmed the importance of the role of aggravating factors in a 
constitutional death penalty statute. By using the paradigm of aggravat-
ing factors to analyze and explain why a statute which did not expressly 
contain aggravating factors satisfied the mandates of Furman, the Court 
implicitly endorsed them as possibly the best means available to guide 
and channel a sentencing authority's discretion, and thus, comply with 
the mandates of Furman. 
In the final two "'76 Cases", Woodson v. North Carolina61 and 
Roberts v. Louisiana, 68 the Court ruled that mandatory death penalty 
use ofnon-statutory aggravating factors in conjunction with statutory aggravating factors 
does not violate the Constitution. 
64. 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
65. Id. at 268-69. The Texas statute's attempt to comply with Furman was a two 
step process. First, the offenses for which the death penalty was a possible punishment 
were narrowed. Second, prior to sentencing_a capital offender to death, the sentencing 
authority had to respond to the following three statutory questions with an affirmative 
answer: 
Id. 
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased 
was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death 
of the deceased or another would result; 
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal 
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and 
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing 
the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the 
deceased. 
66. Id. at 276. The Court further stated that the state's "action in narrowing the 
categories of murders for which a death sentence may ever be imposed serves much the 
same purpose" as the aggravating factors used in the Georgia and Florida statutes. Id. 
at 270. "In fact, each of the five classes of murders made capital by the Texas statute 
is encompassed in Georgia and Florida by one or more of their statutory aggravating 
circumstances." Id. 
67. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
68. 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
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statutes were unconstitutional. These rulings were based upon three 
grounds. First, a mandatory death penalty statute failed to comport with 
contemporary societal values and thus violated the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.69 Second, a mandatory death penalty statute failed to 
provide an adequate response to the mandates of Furman.70 Third, a 
mandatory death penalty statute failed to provide for individualized 
sentencing; which the Court now considered to be a constitutional 
requirement in a capital punishment sentencing scheme. Woodson and 
Roberts mark the first time that the Supreme Court held that individual-
ized .. sentencing is a constitutional mandate rather than merely an 
"enlightened policy."71 Thus, through its unequivocal rejection of 
mandatory death penalty statutes, the Court further increased the 
significance of the role that aggravating factors play in contemporary 
death penalty jurisprudence. 
Although none of these five "'76 Cases" clearly articulates what 
components a constitutional death penalty statute is required to have, 
when the cases are read together several important hints are given by the 
Court as to what might be needed. First, the sentencing authority must 
be directed to examine specific factors that argue in favor of or against 
69. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 288-301; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 332. 
In Woodson, the Court stated: 
The history of mandatory death penalty statutes in the United States_ thus 
reveals that the practice of sentencing to death all persons convicted of a 
particular offense has been rejected as unduly harsh and unworkably rigid. 
The two crucial indicators of evolving standards of decency respecting the 
imposition of punishment in our society-jury determinations and legislative 
enactments both point conclusively to the repudiation of automatic death 
sentences. 
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 292-293. 
70. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302-03 (due to the fact that throughout history 
juries have repeatedly refused to convict on crimes that carry a mandatory death 
sentence, North Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute merely "papers over" the 
problem of unfettered jury discretion and the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the 
death penalty which existed prior to Furman); Roberts, 428 U.S. at 334-36. 
71. In Woodson, the Court stated: 
While the prevailing practice of individualizing sentencing determinations 
generally reflects simply enlightened policy rather than a constitutional 
imperative, we believe that in capital cases the fundamental respect for 
humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the 
character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the 
particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of 
inflicting the penalty of death. 
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (internal citation omitted); see also Roberts, 428 U.S. at 333. 
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the imposition of the death penalty.72 Second, the sentencing 
authority's discretion to impose the death penalty must be limited or 
narrowed so that the sentence of death is possible only for a subclass of 
all offenders convicted of murder.73 Third, the sentencing authority 
must be permitted to consider the individual circumstances of both the 
offender and the offense when exercising its discretion.74 Finally, 
although the "'76 Cases" did not expressly state that aggravating factors 
must be used to perform these functions, the cases did state that if a 
legislature used aggravating factors to perform these functions, their 
death penalty statute would be deemed constitutional.75 Therefore, as 
a .practical matter, the Suprenie Court's decisions in the '"76 Cases" 
forced most states to enact some form of guided discretion statute if they 
wished to retain the death penalty as a sentencing option. 76 This was 
because the inclusion of aggravating factors was the only constitutional 
means which the states had developed, to date, 77 to impose the death 
penalty. 78 
72. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-95 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 
U.S. 242, 257-58 (1976). 
73. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188-95; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 270-74 (1976). 
74. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-04. 
75. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 258-60; Jurek, 428 U.S. 
at 276-77. 
76. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 15A-2000 (1988); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 
art. 905-905.9 (West 1984 & Supp. 1994). Both North Carolina and Louisiana drafted 
guided discretion statutes in response to their mandatory death penalty statutes being 
rendered unconstitutional in Woodson and Roberts, respectively. 
77. It is important to note that in the '"76 Cases" the Supreme Court expressed 
that a guided discretion statute was not necessarily the only procedure which was 
permissible under Furman and its dictates, but was just the only one that had been 
developed to date. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195. 
The Court has reiterated this sentiment several times in subsequent cases. For 
example, in Lockett v. Ohio, the Court made the often-quoted statement that there can 
be "no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases governmental authority should be 
used to impose death." 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978). Furthermore, the Court has stated 
that "in the context of capital punishment, the Constitution does not 'plac[e] totally 
unrealistic conditions on its use."' McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987) 
(quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199 n.50). 
78. In the '"76 Cases" the Supreme Court decided the constitutionality of five 
post-Furman death penalty statutes. Of the three statutes which the Supreme Court ruled 
constitutional, two expressly utilized aggravating factors to comply with the dictates of 
Furman. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 164-65; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 246-50. The third 
constitutional statute, although it did not expressly utilize aggravating factors, was· 
construed as though it did, and was thus held to be constitutional. See Jurek, 428 U.S. 
at 269-71. In ruling that the remaining two statutes were unconstitutional the Supreme 
Court held that mandatory death penalty statutes were not a constitutionally adequate 
response to Furman. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-05; Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 
325, 334-36 (1976). Therefore, following the '"76 Cases," the only way to ensure that 
a death penalty statute was constitutionally adequate was to make it a guided discretion 
statute which utilized aggravating factors. 
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III. AGGRAVATING FACTORS AND THE REFINEMENT OF THEIR ROLE 
IN A CONSTITUTIONAL DEATH PENALTY STATUTE 
Having established the foundation of modem capital punishment 
jurisprudence in Furman and the "'76 Cases," the Supreme Court set out 
to build upon that foundation. The Court sought to do this by defining 
the role which aggravating factors must play in a constitutional death 
penalty statute, as well as placing requirements on the manner in which 
the factors themselves are defined. Consequently, the Court has 
developed an extensive body of law establishing (1) the function which 
aggravating factors are constitutionally mandated to perform and (2) the 
amount of precision that must be utilized in defining each aggravating 
factor. All of this acts to further ensure that each statute genuinely 
provides a "meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which 
[the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is 
not"79 and that the imposition of the death penalty in each case 
complies with contemporary societal values.80 
A. Aggravating Factors Must Genuinely Narrow the Class of 
Persons Eligible for the Death Penalty 
As previously noted, in the "'76 Cases," the Supreme Court held that 
the sentencing authority's discretion to impose the death penalty "must 
be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly 
arbitrary and capricious action."81 In those cases the Court also 
endorsed guided discretion statutes that utilized aggravating factors as 
the preferred means to direct and limit the sentencing authority's 
discretion. However, the Court did not clearly indicate the function 
which aggravating factors perform, so as to enable the guided discretion 
statutes to achieve that constitutional mandate. The exact function an 
79. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,313 (1972) 
(White, J., concurring)). 
80. Whether a challenged punishment comports with contemporary societal values 
is the standard utilized to determine if that punishment is a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. See supra notes 20-33 and 
accompanying text. 
81. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189. 
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aggravating factor is required to perform in a constitutional capital 
punishment statute was therefore something the Court needed to clarify. 
The Court first clearly addressed this issue in Zant v. Stephens.82 In 
Zant, the capital offender appealed his death sentence on several 
grounds, one of which was that Georgia's capital punishment sentencing 
scheme was unconstitutional because of the role which aggravating 
factors played in that scheme.83 Prior to deciding this case, the 
Supreme Court certified a question to the Georgia Supreme Court 
requesting-an explanation of the role of the state's aggravating factors.84 
Based upon the Georgia court's response, the Supreme Court concluded 
that in the Georgia system the finding of an aggravating factor "does not 
play any role in guiding the sentencing body in the exercise of its 
discretion, apart from its function of narrowing the class of persons 
convicted of murder who are eligible for the death penalty." 5 The 
respondent argued that the limited function performed by ·Georgia's 
aggravating factors violated the dictates of Furman and thus rendered the 
Georgia system unconstitutional.86 However, the Supreme Court did 
not agree and held that Georgia's use of aggravating factors was 
constitutional. 87 
In denying the capital offender's claim, the Court stated that it had 
already approved the Georgia system on its face in Gregg, but empha-
sized that its holding in Gregg rested upon "the fundamental requirement 
that each statutory aggravating circumstance must satisfy a constitutional 
82. 462 U.S. 862 (1983). 
83. Id. at 874. 
84. The Georgia Supreme Court responded by analogizing its body of law 
governing homicides to a pyramid. The base of the pyramid is formed by all cases in 
which any form of homicide is charged. In the first plane above the base is the group 
of all homicides which fall into the category of murder. The second plane separates 
from all murder cases those particular cases in which capital punishment is a sentencing 
option for the sentencing authority. This second plane is established by a list of ten 
aggravating factors. Before a murder case can pass beyond this plane the sentencing 
authority must find beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the ten aggravating 
factors exists. If this finding is not made, a murder case may not move past this plane 
and the death penalty is then not a sentencing option. The final plane is that one which 
separates all cases in which the death penalty is a sentencing option from those cases in 
which it is actually imposed. ''There is an absolute discretion in the factfinder to place 
any given case below the [final] plane and not impose death. The plane itself is 
established by the factfinder. In establishing the plane, the factfinder considers all 
evidence in extenuation, mitigation and aggravation of punishment." Id. at 871. 
Aggravating factors are not employed in making this final determination. As a final 
limitation, all sentences of death are automatically reviewed by the Georgia Supreme 
Court to ensure the sentence is not the product of prejudice or caprice. Id. at 870- 72. 
85. Id. at 874. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 879-80. 
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standard derived from the principles of Furman itself."88 That standard 
was not clearly articulated in any of the '"76 Cases", but the Court now 
announced it to be that "an aggravating circumstance must genuinely 
narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must 
reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the 
defendant compared to others found guilty of murder."89 Therefore, 
after Zant, the only function that the Constitution required an aggravat-
ing factor to perform was to "genuinely narrow the class of persons 
eligible for the death penalty."90 The Constitution did not require an 
aggravating factor to do any more.91 
The Zant holding was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Lowenfield
v. Phelps.92 In Lowenfield, the offender was sentenced to death under 
the capital sentencing scheme of Louisiana.93 The petitioner appealed 
88. Id. at 876. 
89. Id. at 877. The Court went on to note that "[o]ur cases indicate ... that 
statutory aggravating circumstances play a constitutionally necessary function at the stage 
of legislative definition: they circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death 
penalty." Id. at 878. 
90. Id. at 877. The Court has reiterated that the role of aggravating factors is to 
narrow the class of offenders who are eligible for the death penalty. In the 1987 case, 
McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court summarized its holdings to date on the death penalty and 
concluded: 
[O]ur decisions since Furman have identified a constitutionally permissible 
range of discretion in imposing the death penalty. First, there is a required 
threshold below which the death penalty cannot be imposed. In this context, 
the State must establish rational criteria that narrow the decisionmaker's 
judgment as to whether the circumstances of a particular defendant's case meet 
the threshold. 
McC!eskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 303-05 (1987). 
91. It is important to note that the sentencing authority must still be permitted to 
consider all aspects of the defendant's record and the particular offense mitigating 
against the imposition of the death penalty, as part of the individualized sentencing 
mandated by Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-05 (1976). However, the 
Supreme Court's decisions have not required aggravating factors to perform any function 
during that portion of the capital sentencing process. 
92. 484 U.S. 231,244 (1988) ("To pass constitutional muster, a capital sentencing 
scheme must 'genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and 
must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant 
compared to others found guilty of murder."' (quoting Zant, 462 U.S. at 877)). 
93. Lowenjield, 484 U.S. at 241-43. In response to its mandatory death penalty 
statute being held unconstitutional in Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335 (1976), 
the Louisiana legislature redrafted its statute. It began by redefining homicide. It 
established five categories of homicide and made the death penalty a sentencing option 
in only its narrowly defined crime of first-degree murder. In order for the sentencing 
authority to be permitted to convict an offender of first-degree murder, it must find that 
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his death sentence on the grounds that the sole aggravating factor found 
by the jury was identical to an element of the capital offense for which 
he was convicted, namely that ''the offender knowingly created a risk of 
death or great bodily harm to more than one person." 94 The Supreme 
Court ,denied the petitioner's appeal and affirmed his death sentence.95 
In denying the petitioner's claims, the Court held that "[t]he use of 
'aggravating circumstances' is not an end in itself, but a means of 
genuinely narrowing the class of death-eligible persons and thereby 
channeling the jury's discretion.''96 Therefore, it was constitutionally 
irrelevant to the Lowen.field Court whether the narrowing function 
performed by aggravating factors was accomplished by the jury during 
the sentencing phase or the guilt phase of the trial, as long as it was 
performed during some phase.97 All that the Constitution 'required was 
that the class of persons eligible for the death penalty was genuinely 
narrowed.98 The Court noted that in order to satisfy this constitutional 
dictate the capital sentencing laws of most states require the sentencing 
authority to :find at least one aggravating factor before it may impose a 
sentence of death.99 
The fact that all the Constitution requires of aggravating factors is that 
they narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty was 
further reinforced by the Court's holding in Blystone v. Pennsylva-
nia. 100 In Blystone, the petitioner was sentenced to death based upon 
the jury's finding of one aggravating factor, and the petitioner appealed. 
The petitioner claimed that his sentence was unconstitutional because he 
did not receive the sort of individualized sentencing that was constitu-
tionally mandated. This claim was premised on the idea that because the 
aggravating circumstances were not assigned weights, the jury was 
"precluded from considering whether the severity of his aggravating 
the facts of the offender's crime place it in one of five narrowly defined groups which 
comprise the crime of first-degree murder. In Lowenfield, the jury found the petitioner 
guilty of first-degree murder based upon the finding that he had "a specific intent to kill 
or to inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person." Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 
243. Once an offender is convicted of first-degree murder, he is then sentenced by the 
same jury in a separate proceeding. Before this jury can sentence an offender to death, 
it must find at least one of Louisiana's ten statutory aggravating factors. Id. at 241-43. 
94. Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 243. 
95. Id. at 246. 
96. Id. at 244. 
97. Id. at 244-45. As support for this statement the Court cited its approval of the 
Texas capital sentencing scheme in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). Id. See supra 
notes 64-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Jurek decision. 
98. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. 
99. Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 244. 
100. 494 U.S. 299 (1990). 
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circumstance warranted the death sentence."101 The Supreme Court 
rejected the petitioner's argument, holding that there was no constitution-
al requirement that the aggravating factors be assigned weights. 102 The 
Court's reasoning was exemplified by its statement that "[t]he presence 
of aggravating circumstances serves the purpose of limiting the class of 
death-eligible defendants, and the Eighth Amendment does not require 
that these aggravating circumstances be further refined or weighed by a 
jury. " 103 In reaching this holding, the Court firmly reinforced that the 
only function the Constitution requires an aggravating factor to perform 
is that it genuinely narrows the class of persons eligible for the death 
penalty. 
B. Aggravating Factors Must Not Be Unconstitutionally Vague 
In order to further ensure that the constitutionally mandated narrowing 
function is properly performed by an aggravating factor, the Supreme 
Court has imposed an additional requirement on the use of aggravating 
factors: they may not be defined in a constitutionally vague manner. All 
guided discretion statutes are based upon the assumption that the 
aggravating factors utilized are defined in a constitutionally permissible 
fashion. If an aggravating factor is not defined in a constitutionally 
permissible fashion, then the class of persons eligible for the death 
penalty cannot be said to be genuinely narrowed.104 The sentencing 
authority would not be provided with sufficient guidance for determining 
whether the factor is present in a particular case. 105 In the '"76 Cases," 
which approved of the use of aggravating factors to comply with the 
dictates of the Constitution, 106 the Court expressly placed no require-
ment upon the manner in which the factors were defined, other than that 
the factors not be too vague. In a footnote in its Gregg decision, the 
Court stated that "[a] system could have standards so vague that they 
would fail adequately to channel the sentencing decision patterns of 
juries with the result that a pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing 
101. Id. at 306. 
102. Id. at 306-08. 
103. Id. at 306-07. 
104. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). 
105. Espinosa v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2926, 2928 (1992). 
106. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 
U.S. 242, 259-60 (1976). 
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like that found unconstitutional in Furman could occur."107 Other than 
this token requirement, the Court made no other mention of how 
definitively each aggravating factor must be defined. Consequently, the 
Court set out to clarify this aspect of the guided discretion statute. 
The first case to truly address the manner in which an aggravating 
factor was defined was Godfrey v. Georgia. 108 In Godfrey, the 
petitioner was sentenced to death under the Georgia capital punishment 
sentencing scheme approved by the Supreme Court in Gregg.109 The 
jury had sentenced the petitioner to death based upon its finding of one 
aggravating factor, namely "that the offense of murder was outrageously 
or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman."110 The petitioner, seizing 
upon the Court's above-referenced language from Gregg, 111 appealed 
and challenged this aggravating factor as being so vague that it failed to 
suitably direct and limit the sentencing authority's discretion, as the 
Furman decision required. 112 
The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner and held that in this 
particular case the construction which the Georgia courts had given to 
this aggravating factor did in fact make the factor unconstitutionally 
vague. It did not suitably direct or limit the sentencing authority's 
discretion. 113 The Court found that "[a] person of ordinary sensibility 
could fairly characterize almost every murder as 'outrageously or 
wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman"' and therefore, "[t]here is nothing 
in these few words, standing alone, that implies any inherent restraint on 
the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence."114 
In arriving at this holding, the Court revealed two important require-
ments that the Constitution places upon the manner in which aggravating 
factors are defined. First, the Court essentially applied the requirement 
that was placed on the entire capital punishment sentencing scheme in 
the "'76 Cases," namely that the sentencing authority's discretion be 
107. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 n.46. 
108. 446 U.S. 420 (1980). 
109. Id. at 422-23. 
110. Id. at 426. The aggravating factor actually read that the offense "was 
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity 
of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim," Id. at 422. The jury was instructed in 
this language. Id. at 426. However, the jury returned the death sentence stating only 
that "the offense of murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman." 
Id. at 426. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the sentence stating that the language 
used by the jury was "not objectionable" and that the evidence supported the finding. 
Id. at 427. 
111. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
112. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 423. 
113. Id. at 432-33. 
114. Id. at 428-29. 
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suitably directed and limited to each aggravating factor that is utilized 
by the scheme. The Court noted that if a state wished to authorize the 
death penalty as a sentencing option it has a constitutional responsibility 
not only to "tailor" its law, but also to "apply" its law in each case, so 
as to avoid the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death 
penalty. 115 As part of this responsibility the state must "define the 
crimes for which death may be the sentence in a way that obviates 
'standardless [sentencing] discretion. "'116 Therefore, in defining each 
aggravating factor, the states must provide the sentencing authority with 
"'clear and objective standards' that provide 'specific and detailed 
guidance"' to the sentencing authority in the exercise of its discre-
tion.117 The state's failure to do so will result in the noncomplying 
factor being deemed unconstitutionally vague. 
Second, the Court suggested that even if the state did not adequately 
define an aggravating factor, its deficient legislative definition could be 
saved from being deemed unconstitutional if the state's courts applied 
a sufficiently limiting construction to the factor. 118 The Court did not 
expressly stat(:? that this was a method to "save" an unconstitutional 
factor, but the means utilized by the Court to analyze the relevant 
aggravating factor suggests this conclusion. Rather than merely 
analyzing the amount of guidance provided by the legislature's definition 
of the aggravating factor, the Court delved into the Georgia state courts' 
application of the challenged factor. The Court found that in past capital 
punishment cases, the Georgia Supreme Court had required additional 
facts to be found in regards to this factor before it would permit a death 
sentence to be based upon this aggravating factor. 119 However, in the 
115. Id. at 428. 
116. Id. at 428 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
117. Id. (footnote omitted). 
118. Id. at 422. 
119. The Supreme Court found that all Georgia death sentences that had been 
based upon this aggravating factor and had been affirmed by the Georgia Supreme Court, 
through its automatic appeal process, had one if not all three of the following findings 
in addition to the finding of this aggravating factor: 
(1) "[T]hat the evidence that the offense was 'outrageously or wantonly vile, 
horrible or inhuman' had to demonstrate 'torture, depravity of mind, or an 
aggravated battery to the victim"; 
(2) "[T]he phrase, 'depravity of mind,' comprehended only the kind of mental 
state that led the murderer to torture or to commit an aggravated battery before 
killing his victim"; and 
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petitioner's case,. the Court found that neither the Georgia Supreme 
Court, nor any other Georgia state court, had required any such 
additional finding. Therefore, although the factor may have been 
constitutionally applied in other cases, it was not constitutionally applied 
in Godfrey because the construction applied provided no more guidance 
than the vague language of the statute. 120 The Court therefore con-
cluded that the · factor was unconstitutionally vague as applied in this 
case, but made no express pronouncement on the possibility of a limiting 
construction "saving" an unconstitutionally vague factor. 
In Maynard v. Cartwright121 the Court invalidated another aggravat-
ing factor on the ground that the factor was unconstitutionally vague. 
In Maynard, one of the two aggravating factors upon which the 
offender's death sentence was based was that the murder was "especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel."122 The respondent challenged this factor 
as unconstitutionally vague and the Supreme Court affirmed a lower 
court's ruling by holding that the factor was indeed invalid because it 
was unconstitutionally vague.123 
In Maynard, the Court conducted essentially the same analysis as it 
had in Godfrey before arriving at the conclusion that this aggravating 
factor was unconstitutionally vague, at least as it was applied in this 
case, because there was "no principled way to distinguish this case, in 
which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it 
was not." 124 As in Godfrey, the aggravating factor in Maynard failed 
to channel the sentencing authority's discretion by clear and objective 
standards which provided specific and detailed guidance.125 However, 
the Court's conclusion that the aggravating factor was unconstitutionally 
vague is not the only important holding in Maynard. 
(3) "[T]hat the word, 'torture,' must be construed in pari materia with 
'aggravated battery' so as to require evidence of serious physical abuse of the 
victim before death." 
Id. at 431. 
120. Id. at 432. The Court stated: 
[T]he validity of the petitioner's death sentences turns on whether, in light of 
the facts and circumstances of the murders that he was convicted of commit-
ting, the Georgia Supreme Court can be said to have applied a constitutional 
construction of the phrase "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman 
.... " We conclude that the answer must be no. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
121. 486 U.S. 356 (1988). 
122. Id. at 359. The other aggravating factor was that the offender "knowingly 
created a great risk of death to more than one person." Id. at 358-59. 
123. Id. at 360. 
124. Id. at 363 (quoting Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 433). 
125. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 364. 
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The Court also expressly recognized that a limiting construction could 
cure an unconstitutionally vague aggravating factor. 126 While the 
Court's analysis in Godfrey suggested this rule, 127 Maynard is the first 
time that the Court explicitly recognized it. Thus, after Maynard, the 
appropriate constitutional test involved the manner in which the 
aggravating factor is applied by the courts, not the manner in which the 
factor is defined by the legislature. Although the Court refused to state 
what sort of limiting construction would be required to cure a deficient 
factor, deferring that task to the Oklahoma state courts or legislature, 128 
it is reasonable to assume that the limiting construction must meet the 
same standard as the aggravating factor itself. 
With these various standards in mind, the Court in Walton v. 
Arizona129 established the inquiry that a federal court must undertake 
when it is determining whether a particular aggravating factor is 
unconstitutionally vague. First, the court must "determine whether the 
statutory language defining the circumstance is itself too vague to 
provide any guidance to the sentencer."130 Second, if the language is 
too vague the court must "attempt to determine whether the state courts 
have further defined the vague terms and, if they have done so, whether 
those definitions are constitutionally sufficient, i.e., whether they provide 
some guidance to the sentencer."131 If the court determines that the 
aggravating factor fails both of.these inquiries then it is .deemed to be 
unconstitutionally vague. 
Thus, in addition to using their aggravating factors in a manner that 
genuinely narrows the class of persons eligible for the death penalty, the 
states must also define their aggravating factors in a manner that is not 
126. Id. at 362. The Court stated that because the challenged aggravating factor 
was unconstitutionally vague on its face and the state courts had not "adopted a limiting 
construction that cured the infirmity," the challenged aggravating factor violated the 
Eighth Amendment. Id. at 360. 
127. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text. 
128. Maynard, 483 U.S. at 365. 
129. 497 U.S. 639 (1990). 
130. Id. at 654. If the sentencer's discretion is channeled by clear and objective 
standards that provide specific and detailed guidance, then the sentencer is provided with 
sufficient guidance and this constitutional requirement is met. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 
446 U.S. 420,428 (1980); see also supra notes 108-17 and accompanying text. 
131. Walton, 497 U.S. at 654. 
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unconstitutionally vague. 132 In respect to this requirement, the Court 
has recognized that the "proper degree of definition" of most aggravating 
factors is ''not susceptible of mathematical precision,"133 however, what 
is essentially required is that the description of the factor not be "so 
vague as to leave the sentencer without sufficient guidance for determin-
ing the presence or absence of the factor."134 If the sentencing 
authority is provided with "'clear and objective standards' that provide 
'specific and detailed guidance"' in the exercise of its discretion, the 
factor will pass constitutional muster.135 However, it is important to 
note that the true test is not necessarily that the legislature's definition 
meets this standard, but that the state courts' application of the factor 
meets this standard. Regardless of the adequacy of the legislative 
definition, if the application of an aggravating factor does not meet this 
standard it will be deemed to be unconstitutionally vague.136 
IV. TUILAEPA V. CALIFORNIA: AGGRAVATING FACTORS AND THE 
SELECTION PHASE OF CAPITAL SENTENCING 
As the aforesaid cases demonstrate, the Supreme Court has spent a 
great deal of time developing the requirements which the Constitution 
places upon a capital punishment statute. After analyzing the entire 
process utilized to sentence an offender to death in the "'76 Cases," the 
Court switched its focus to the individual aspects of the capital 
sentencing process and has not returned to examine the process as a 
whole. As a result, the requirements the Court has developed for these 
individual aspects have not been placed in the broader context of the 
entire capital sentencing process. However, if the Court's decisions are 
read in conjunction with one another, they reveal that the capital 
sentencing process is in fact comprised of two distinct phases: the 
eligibility phase and the selection phase.137 The Court's decisions have 
not truly recognized or developed this distinction because of their focus 
on the components instead of the entire process. 
The essence of the process revealed by the Court's decisions is that 
there are two very different determinations which must be made before 
the death penalty can be imposed upon an offender. First, the Court's 
132. See, e.g., Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 432-33; Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 867 
(1983); Maynard, 486 U.S. at 363-64; Walton, 497 U.S. at 654; Stringer v. Black, 503 
U.S. 222, 228 (1992); Espinosa v. Florida, 112 S. Ct 2926, 2928 (1992). 
133. Walton, 497 U.S. at 655. 
134. Esptnosa, 112 S. Ct. at 2928. 
135. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428 (footnote omitted). 
136. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text. 
137. Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2634 (1994). 
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opinions suggest that the sentencing authority must determine that the 
offender is in fact part of a narrow class of murderers138 eligible for 
the death penalty.1 9 This determination entails a decision by the 
sentencing authority whether at least one of a statutory list of aggravat-
ing factors exists in the particular case and thus sets it apart from the 
many cases in which the death penalty is not imposed.140 Second, the 
Court's opinions suggest that some specific aspect of the offender's 
crime or character must warrant him being sentenced to death as 
opposed to imprisoned for life. The Court has stated that ''the Eighth 
Amendment requires consideration of the character and record of the 
individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a 
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty 
of death."141 However, the Court's decisions have not clearly ad-
dressed the relationship between these two determinations. 142 
In fact, the Court's opinions have focused almost exclusively on the 
eligibility determination and whether it was properly made in a particular 
case. 143 Consequently, the requirements developed by the Court for a 
constitutional capital punishment statute have focused on the eligibility 
decision, ensuring that the constitutionally mandated narrowing function 
is performed.144 These cases have not expressly limited their holdings 
138. Again, this Comment only deals with the death penalty as a punishment for 
the crime of murder. 
139. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877-78 (1983). 
140. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980). The Court stated that there 
must be a "principled way to distinguish [the cases] in which the death penalty [is] 
imposed, from the many cases in which it [is] not." Id. 
141. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (citations omitted). 
142. In Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983), the Court suggested that there was 
an eligibility and a selection phase to the process of sentencing an offender to death. 
However in Zant, the Court did not expand on this suggestion and it did not return to 
this suggestion until its Tuilaepa decision. The extent of the Court's discussion of this 
distinction in Zant is as follows: 
Our cases indicate, then, that statutory aggravating circumstances play a 
constitutionally necessary function at the stage of legislative definition: they 
circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. . . . What is 
important at the selection stage is an individualized determination on the basis · 
of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime. 
Id. at 878-79. 
143. See supra notes 79-136 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
requirements which the Constitution places upon aggravating factors as they are utilized 
in the eligibility phase of capital sentencing. 
144. See supra notes 79-136 and accompanying text for the discussion of those 
requirements. 
619 
to the eligibility phase, but as this Comment indicates, that was the clear 
implication. Some of the Court's decisions do mention the selection 
decision, but this is typically only in passing and do not develop 
requirements on how that decision is to be made.145 
However, in the recent case of Tuilaepa v. California146 the Supreme 
Court was faced with a constitutional challenge to a death sentence that 
forced the Court to analyze and develop the distinction· between these 
two phases and what each requires of an aggravating factor. In 
Tuilaepa, the defendant was sentenced to death pursuant to the 
California capital sentencing scheme.147 The defendant appealed his 
death sentence claiming that three of the aggravating factors used in the 
California capital punishment statute were unconstitutionally vague.148 
Under California law, the process of sentencing an offender to death 
is comprised of two parts: the trial and the sentencing hearing.· At the 
trial, the trier of fact149 is required to make two separate findings 
The Court's emphasis on the eligibility phase is due in large part to the fact that nearly 
all of the Court's decisions analyzing aggravating factors have dealt with challenges to 
capital punishment statutes that utilized the same set of aggravating factors in both the 
eligibility and the selection phase of capital sentencing. See, e.g., Proffitt v. Florida, 428 
U.S. 242 (1976); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988); Clemons v. Mississippi, 
494 U.S. 738 (1990). Therefore, the Court has had no real need to develop a set of 
requirements for each phase of the capital sentencing process that utilized aggravating 
factors. 
145. The cases that speak of the selection phase of sentencing do not discuss the 
role that aggravating factors must perform in that stage. Instead, they discuss what the 
Constitution requires of that phase in general. In particular, those cases discuss the 
constitutional requirement that the offender must receive individualized sentencing and 
that during that process the sentencing authority must not be prohibited from considering 
all relevant mitigating factors. See, e.g., Woodson, at 303-05; Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 604-05 (1978); Zant, 462 U.S. at 878-79; McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305-
06 (1987). In Blystone v. Pennsylvania, the Court went so far as to state that "[t]he 
requirement of individualized sentencing in capital cases is satisfied by allowing the jury 
to consider all relevant mitigating evidence." 494 U.S. 299, 307 (1990). Thus, none of 
the Supreme Court cases discussing the selection phase of capital sentencing have made 
any mention of the function aggravating factors must perform during that phase. 
146. 114 S. Ct. 2630 (1994). 
147. Tuilaepa is actually a consolidated case. Tuilaepa v. California, ll4 S. Ct. 
598 (1993). The Supreme Court consolidated Tuilaepa v. California, docket number 93-
5131, and Proctor v. California, docket number 93-5161, because the two cases 
presented the identical constitutional question: are the specified aggravating factors used 
by the California sentencing authority to sentence the defendant to death un-
constitutionally vague. This Comment will only discuss the defendant in Tuilaepa 
because he challenged three of California's factors, while the defendant in Proctor only 
challenged one factor and that factor is one that the defendant in Tuilaepa also 
challenged. 
148. Tuilaepa, ll4 S. Ct. at 2632. 
149. The trier of fact shall be a jury unless the defendant has voluntarily waived 
this right. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 190.4 (West 1988). 
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before the offender can even be eligible for the death penalty. 15° First, 
the trier of fact must convict the offender of first-degree murder. 151 
Second, the trier of fact must find beyond a reasonable doubt that at 
least one of the statutorily enumerated "special circumstances" exists in 
the case.152 If the offender is found guilty of first-degree murder, but 
the trier of fact does not find at least one "special circumstance," the 
offender is not eligible for the death penalty. 
The case then proceeds to the sentencing hearing, provided that both 
of the requisite findings were made during the trial stage. At the 
sentencing hearing, a separate proceeding is conducted and the trier of 
fact153 is presented with all evidence in aggravation and mitigation of 
the offender's sentence. After hearing all of the evidence, the trier of 
fact is given another list of enumerated factors and instructed to 
weigh154 all of the relevant factors that aggravate in favor of the death 
150. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 190.1 (West 1988). 
151. First-degree murder is defined in CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1988 & 
Supp. 1994). 
152. CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 190.2, 190.4 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994). 
At the trial, the offender is charged with first-degree murder and any of the 19 "special 
circumstances" that the prosecution believes are present in the case. The prosecution and 
the defense then present evidence as to both the charge of first-degree murder and all 
of the "special circumstances" charged. If the trier of fact finds the offender guilty of 
first-degree murder, it must make a special finding in regards to each "special 
circumstance" charged in the case, stating whether the trier found each to be true or 
false. In order for a special circumstance to be deemed true, the trier of fact must find 
that it exists beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 
The 19 "special circumstances" are enumerated in § 190.2 and include such things as 
the murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain, the victim was a peace 
officer, or the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in any one of a 
list of nine felonies. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 190.2 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994). 
153. During the sentencing hearing, the trier of fact is a jury unless the offender 
and the prosecution waive the right to a jury. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 190.4 (West 1988). 
154. The fact that California requires its sentencing authority to "weigh" the 
aggravating factors against the mitigating factors, in order to determine which offenders 
shall be sentenced to death, makes California a weighing state. 
In general, there are two types of guided discretion statutes: weighing and non-
weighing. The sentencing authority in a state that employs a weighing statute is required 
to weigh the aggravating factors against the mitigating factors and determine whether the 
evidence favors the offender being sentenced to death or life imprisonment. In essence, 
what each member of the sentencing authority is required to do is to "mentally balance" 
the aggravating and mitigating factors in a qualitative fashion. This is in contrast to a 
quantitative balancing in which the sentencing authority would simply say that the 
offender should be sentenced to death because there are three aggravating factors and 
only two mitigating factors. People v. Howard, I Cal. 4th 1132, 1188, 824 P.2d 1315, 
1348, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268, 301 (1992). 
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The sentencing authority in a state that employs a non-weighing statute is not required 
to perform this analysis. Instead, the sentencing authority is only required to find 
aggravating factors as a threshold matter to determine which offenders are eligible for 
the death penalty. If at least one aggravating factor is found to exist, the offender is 
deemed to be eligible for the death penalty and the sentencing authority then "considers 
all evidence in extenuation, mitigation and aggravation of punishment" when determining 
which offenders will be sentenced to death. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 870-73 
(1983). Once an offender is deemed to be eligible for the death penalty, the sentencing 
authority is not required to perform any sort of weighing analysis. All that is required 
is that it considers all of the relevant evidence. 
Presently 38 states have death penalty statutes on their books. Of those states, 23 
employ weighing statutes while 13 employ non-weighing statutes. The statutes in the 
remaining two states can be categorized as neither weighing nor non-weighing. 
The 23 states that employ a weighing statute and their statutory provisions establishing 
the procedure to be followed when sentencing an offender to death are set out below: 
I. Alabama, see ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-39 to 13A-5-59 (1994). 
2. Arkansas, see ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-601 to 5-4-618 (Michie 1993) . 
3. California, see CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.1-190.9 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994). 
4. Colorado, see Cow. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 16-11-103 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993). 
5. Delaware, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (1987 & Supp. 1992). 
6. Florida, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994). 
7. Idaho, see IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (1987). 
8. Indiana, see IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (Bums Supp. 1994). 
9. Kansas, see 1994 Kansas Sess. Laws Ch. 252 § 4(e); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-
4625, 21-4626 (Supp. 1993). 
10. Maryland, see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (Supp. 1993). 
11. Mississippi, see MISS. CODE ANN.§§ 99-19-101, 99-19-103 (1994). 
12. Missouri, see Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 565.030-565.040 (Vernon Supp. 1994). 
13. Nebraska, see NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2519 to 29-2528 (1989). 
14. Nevada, see NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 200.030-200.035 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 
1993). 
15. New Hampshire, see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (Supp. 1993). 
16. New Jersey, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c) (West Supp. 1994). 
17. New Mexico, see N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-18-14, 31-18-15.1, 31-20A-l to 31-
20A-6 (Michie 1994). 
18. New York, see 1995 N.Y. Laws ch. 1, § 20 (codified at N.L. PENAL LAW 
§ 60.06; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27). 
19. North Carolina, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1988). 
20. Ohio, see Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03-2929.05 (Baldwin 1992). 
21. Oklahoma, see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 701.10-701.15 (West 1983 & Supp. 
1994). 
22. Pennsylvania, see 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (1982 & Supp. 1994). 
23. Tennessee, see TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-204 to 39-13-206, 39-13-208 (Supp. 
1994). 
The 13 states that employ a non-weighing statute and their statutory provisions are as 
follows: 
I. Arizona, see ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (Supp. 1993). 
2. Connecticut, see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-46a to 53a-46b (West 1985 & 
Supp. 1994). 
3. Georgia, see GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (Harrison Supp. 1993). 
4. Illinois, see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992). 
5. Kentucky, see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (Baldwin Supp. 1993). 
6. Louisiana, see LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905-905.9 (West 1984 & Supp. 
1994). 
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penalty against those factors that mitigate against the death penalty.155 
7. Montana, see MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-301 to 46-18-310 {1993). 
8. South Carolina, see S.C. CODE ANN.§§ 16-3-20, 16-3-25 {Law. Co-op. 1985 & 
Supp. 1993) . 
. 9. South Dakota, see S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-27A-1 to 23A-27A-14 
(1988 & Supp. 1994) . 
10. Utah, see UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-206 to 76-3-207, 76-5-202 {Supp. 1994). 
11. Virginia, see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-264.2 to 19.2-264.4 {Michie 1990 & Supp. 
1994).
12. Washington, see WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§§ 10.95.020-10.95.150 {West 1990 & 
Supp. 1994). 
13. Wyoming, see WYO. STAT. §§ 6-2-102 to 6-2-103 {Supp. 1994). 
The remaining two states, which can be categorized as neither weighing nor non-
weighing, are as follows: 
1. Oregon, see OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 {1990). 
2. Texas, see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.37.071-37.0711 (West Supp. 1994). 
The states which currently do not employ the death penalty are as follows: Alaska, 
Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. The District of Columbia also does not 
currently employ capital punishment. See Patricia Mitchell, Executions in America, 
L.A. TIMES, May 11, 1994, at A5 ( chart). The article cited lists New York as not having 
the death penalty. However, in March of 1995, New York enacted a capital punishment 
statute which is set to go into effect on September 1, 1995. 1995 N.Y. Laws ch. 1, sess. 
2850, art. 4843, §§ 20, 38. 
155. This list of 11 factors, which is contained in California Penal Code § 190.3, 
is as follows: 
(a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in 
the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found 
to be true pursuant to section 190.1.
(b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which 
involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or 
implied threat to use force or violence. 
(c) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction. 
( d) Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under 
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 
(e) Whether or not the victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal 
conduct or consented to the homicidal act. 
(f) Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which the 
defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his 
conduct. 
(g) Whether or not defendant acted under extreme duress or under the 
substantial domination of another person. 
(h) Whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect, or 
the affects of intoxication. 
(i) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. 
(j) Whether or not the defendant was an accomplice to the offense and his 
participation in the commission of the offense was relatively minor. 
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If the trier of fact finds that the factors which weigh in favor of the 
death penalty outweigh the factors which mitigate against it, then the 
trier is required to impose the death penalty.15 If the trier finds that 
the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors, the trier is 
required to impose a sentence of life imprisonment.157 In making this 
determination, the sentencing authority is not required to specify which 
aggravating and mitigating factors it found, but only that the aggravating 
factors outweigh the mitigating factors or vice versa. 158 Thus, under 
the California capital sentencing scheme the sentencing authority must 
consider two separate lists of aggravating factors before it is permitted 
to sentence the offender to death.159 
In Tuilaepa, the jury found at the trial that the defendant was guilty 
of first-degree murder and that the one "special circumstance" charged 
by the prosecution was true. 160 At the sentencing hearing, the defen-
dant was unanimously sentenced to death by the jury based upon its 
finding that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating fac-
tors.161 On automatic appeal to the California Supreme Court, the 
(k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even 
though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. 
CAL. PENAL CODE§ 190.3 (West 1988). 
156. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 376-77 (1990). The Supreme Court has 
upheld the mandatory "shall impose" language of the California statute, holding that 
there is no constitutional requirement that the sentencing authority be given the freedom 
to decline to impose the death penalty when the sentencing authority decides that the 
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. Id. 
157. California Penal Code Section 190.3 provides that: 
After having heard and received all of the evidence, and after having heard 
and considered the arguments of counsel, the trier of fact shall consider, take 
into account and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
referred to in this section, and shall impose a sentence of death if the trier of 
fact concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances. If the trier offact determines that the mitigating circumstances 
outweigh the aggravating circumstances the trier of fact shall impose a 
sentence of confinement in state prison for a term of life without the 
possibility of parole. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988). 
158. See CAL. PENAL CODE§ 190.4 (West 1988). 
159. One list of aggravating factors is considered during the trial and a separate list 
of aggravating factors is considered during the sentencing hearing. See CAL. PENAL 
CODE §§ 190.2-190.4 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994). 
160. Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2634 (1994). The special 
circumstance that the jury found to be true in Tuilaepa was that the murder was 
committed during the commission of a robbery. Id. 
In Proctor the jury found three special circumstances to be true. Those "special 
circumstances" were: (1) that the murder was committed during the commission of a 
rape, (2) that the murder was committed during the commission of a burglary, and (3) 
that the murder included the infliction of torture. Id. 
161. Id. In Proctor, the jury also unanimously sentenced the defendant to death. 
Id. 
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defendant argued that three of the aggravating factors upon which the 
jury was instructed during the sentencing hearing were unconstitutionally 
vague.162 The three aggravating factors which the defendant chal-
lenged were enumerated in -California Penal Code section 190.3, 
subsections (a), (b) and (i).163 However, the California Supreme Court 
affirmed the defendant's death sentence, holding that the challenged 
factors were not unconstitutionally vague because they "direct the 
sentencer's attention to specific, provable, and commonly understandable 
facts about the defendant and the capital crime that might bear on his 
moral culpability."164 
Following the California Supreme Court's decision, the defendant 
petitioned the United States Supreme Court for writ of certiorari. It is 
important to note that at no stage of his appeal did the defendant 
challenge the "special circumstance'' found at the trial stage which made 
him eligible for the death penalty. 165 Consequently, the only question 
162. People v. Tuilaepa, 4 Cal. 4th 569, 594, 842 P.2d 1142, 1157, 15 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 382, 397 (1992). On the automatic appeal to the California Supreme Court in 
Proctor, the defendant challenged one of these aggravating factors as unconstitutionally 
vague. People v. Proctor, 4 Cal. 4th 499, 550-51, 842 P.2d 1100, 1130, 15 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 340, 370 (1992). 
163. Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2637 (1994). 
These three factors were: 
(a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in 
the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found 
to be true pursuant to Section 190.1. 
(b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which 
involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or 
implied threat to use force or violence. 
(i) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 {West 1988). 
The defendant in Proctor only challenged factor (a). Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2637. 
164. People v. Tuilaepa, 4 Cal. 4th 569, 595, 842 P.2d 1142, 1157-58, 15 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 382, 397-98 (1992). The California Supreme Court went on to conclude that 
"[h]aving met these standards of relevance and specificity, factors (a), (b), and (i) are not 
'illusory' or otherwise impermissibly 'vague."' Id. at 595, 842 P.2d at 1158, 15 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d at 398 (construing Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130, 1139 (1992)). 
In Proctor, the defendant only challenged factor (a) and, in affirming the defendant's 
death sentence, the California Supreme Court held that "[t]he United States Supreme 
Court itself has established that the circumstances surrounding a capital offense 
constitute one of the criteria upon which the jury should base its penalty determination." 
People v. Proctor, 4 Cal. 4th 499, 551, 842 P.2d 1100, 1130, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 340, 370 
(1992). 
165. Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2636 (1994). 
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which the Supreme Court agreed to hear was the defendant's claim that 
three of the aggravating factors used in California's sentencing hearing 
were unconstitutionally vague, and therefore, it was improper to instruct 
the sentencing authority as to those factors. 166 
The defendant's case was unique because it presented a problem with 
which the Court had never dealt. The aggravating factors that the 
defendant challenged are utilized only to select which offenders will be 
sentenced to death. These factors do not determine which offenders are 
eligible for the death penalty. In fact, the challenged aggravating factors 
are not even considered until after a separate set of aggravating factors 
has been utilized to determine that the offender is indeed eligible. This 
was unique, because all of the previous challenges to aggravating factors 
that the Court has heard were concerned with aggravating factors that 
determined which offenders were eligible for the death penalty, in 
addition to which offenders would be selected to receive the death 
penalty.167 Therefore, prior to examining the merits of the defendant's 
vagueness challenge, the Court had to examine the two-phase capital 
sentencing process in order to determine what is required of an 
aggravating factor used solely during the selection phase. 
In order to distinguish between the two phases of the capital sentenc-
ing process, the Court had to :finally place all of the requirements that it 
had developed over the past twenty years into the broader context of the 
capital sentencing process as a whole. The results of this examination 
were fourfold. First, the Court expressly recognized that its cases did in 
fact.reveal this two-stage process of sentencing an offender to death, and 
that each of these two phases requires something different from an 
aggravating factor.168 Second, during the eligibility phase of the 
capital sentencing process, an aggravating factor must genuinely narrow 
the class of offenders eligible for the death penalty.169 Third, during 
the selection phase of the capital sentencing process, an aggravating 
factor must provide the sentencing authority with the means by which 
to make an individualized determination of which offenders will be 
166. Id. at 2633. In delivering the opinion of the Court Justice Kennedy stated that 
this case presents ''the question whether three of the § 190.3 penalty-phase factors are 
unconstitutionally vague under decisions of this Court construing the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment." Id. 
167. See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Zant v. Stephens, 462 
U.S. 862 (1983); Maynard v. Cartwright1 486 U.S. 356 (1988); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 
484 U.S. 231 (1988); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990). 
168. Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2634-36. 
169. Id. at 2634-35. 
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sentenced to death and which will not.17° Finally, regardless of which 
phase of the capital sentencing process the sentencing authority considers 
an aggravating factor, that factor cannot be unconstitutionally vague. 
This requirement is imposed because the underlying principle of the 
Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence is that the sentencing 
process must minimize the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the 
death penalty. Therefore, in addition to meeting the requirements placed 
upon an aggravating factor, a factor must also act to minimize the 
arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty by not being 
unconstitutionally vague.171 
Thus, having established what was required of an aggravating factor 
in each phase of the capital sentencing process, the Court's next task was 
to determine what standards would be used to decide if these require-
ments were met. In particular, the Court needed to determine the 
appropriate standard to be used to decide if an eligibility or selection 
phase factor is unconstitutionally vague. The Court completed this task 
very quickly by simply announcing the standard it was going to use, 
without analysis or discussion as to how the standard was developed. 
The standard which the Court announced was that "a factor is not 
unconstitutional if it has some 'common-sense core of meaning ... that 
criminal juries should be capable of understanding. "'172 
After announcing this broadly-stated standard, the Court used it to 
examine the defendant's vagueness challenge to the three California 
selection phase aggravating factors. The Court's application of its newly 
stated standard was comgrised of little more than simply restating the 
three challenged factors 73 and concluding that the factors were not 
unconstitutionally vague because they were "phrased in conventional and 
understandable terms."174 As support for its conclusion that the 
170. Id. at 2635. See also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-05 
(1976); supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
171. Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2635. 
172. Id. at 2635-36 (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,279 (1976) (White, J., 
concurring)). 
173. See supra note 163 for a list of the factors challenged in Tuilaepa. 
174. Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2637. 
In particular the Court held: factor (a) was not unconstitutionally vague because it 
was phrased "in understandable terins"; factor (b) was not unconstitutionally vague 
because it was "phrased in conventional and understandable terms"; and factor (i) was 
not unconstitutionally vague because the petitioner's challenge was not really a 
vagueness challenge, rather it was merely a complaint that the application of factor (i) 
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challenged factors were not unconstitutionally vague, the Court stated 
that the subject matter which the three factors directed the sentencing 
authority to consider had all been previously approved by the Court as 
information which is relevant to the process of sentencing an offender 
to death. 175 Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the 
California Supreme Court, as well as the defendant's death sentence.176 
V. LIMITATION OF THE "COMMON SENSE" STANDARD 
The holding of the Court's decision in Tuilaepa is that the three 
challenged selection phase aggravating factors are not unconstitutionally 
vague because they possess some "common-sense core of meaning . . . 
that criminal juries should be capable of understanding."177 However, 
after taking great efforts in its opinion to clarify the requirements that 
each phase of the capital sentencing process places upon an aggravating 
factor, the Court fails to clearly articulate whether this "common-sense" 
standard applies to aggravating factors utilized in the eligibility phase, 
the selection phase, or both phases of the capital sentencing process. 
The Court simply announces that "a factor" is unconstitutionally vague 
if it does not meet this "common-sense" standard.178 Therefore, for 
the five reasons which follow, this Comment argues that the "common-
sense" standard which the Court announced in Tuilaepa should only be 
used to determine whether aggravating factors in the selection phase of 
the capital sentencing process are unconstitutionally vague. 
First, it is proper to limit the "common-sense" standard to the selection 
phase of the capital sentencing process because the only issue on which 
the Court granted certiorari was the constitutional validity of three of 
California's selection phase aggravating factors. 179 Furthermore, the 
Court expressly stated that it was not addressing any aspect of 
California's eligibility phase because the defendant had not challenged 
was difficult. Nonetheless, the Court ruled that there was "no constitutional deficiency 
in factor (i)." Id. at 2637-38. 
175. Id. The prior decisions which the Court refers to as support for its conclusion 
were: Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (holding that the 
"consideration of ... the circumstances of the particular offense [is] ... a constitution-
ally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death"); Jurek v. Texas, 
428 U.S. 262, 269 (1976) (explaining that the sentencer is permitted to consider the 
offender's past criminal record in determining his future dangerousness); Eddings v. 
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-17 (1982) (explaining that the age of the offender may be 
a relevant factor in the sentencing decision). 
176. Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2639. 
177. Id. at 2636 (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 279 (1976) (White, J., 
concurring)). 
178. Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2635-36. 
179. Id. 
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on appeal the validity of any of the eligibility phase aggravating 
factors. 18° Consequently, if a court applies the "common-sense" 
standard to both eligibility and selection phase aggravating factors, 
which it should not, the application to the eligibility phase would be 
unprecedented. 
Second, limiting the applicability of the "common-sense" standard 
exclusively to the selection phase is necessary in order to ensure that it 
is a viable standard which does not conflict with any of the settled 
principles of the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. As the 
Tuilaepa decision reinforces, during the eligibility phase, the class of 
offenders which are eligible for the death penalty must be genuinely 
narrowed, while during the selection phase the determination of which 
offenders will be sentenced to· death must be made on an individualized 
basis after considering the character of the offender and the circumstanc-
es of the crime.181 To ensure that these two functions are in fact 
performed, and performed in a manner that is not arbitrary or capricious, 
the further requirement that an aggravating factor utilized at either stage 
of the capital sentencing process not be unconstitutionally vague is 
imposed.1 2 Therefore, the standards used to determine whether an 
-aggravating factor is unconstitutionally vague must ensure that the 
sentencing authority is provided with meaningful guidance when 
performing each of these functions. 183 
The "common-sense" standard simply does not ensure that during the 
eligibility phase the sentencing authority is provided with meaningful 
guidance. During the eligibility phase, an objective determination is 
made by the sentencing authority as to whether certain aggravating 
factors exist in a particular case. This determination is made in order to 
ensure that the constitutionally mandated narrowing function is 
180. Id. at 2636. 
181. See supra notes 167-170 and accompanying text. 
182. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
183. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (stating that "[a] capital 
sentencing scheme must, in short, provide a 'meaningful basis for distinguishing the few 
cases in which [the penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not"') 
(quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring)); Gregg 
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (stating that "the concerns expressed in Furman 
that the penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met 
by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate 
information and guidance"). 
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performed and performed in a rationally reviewable fasbion. 184 
However, a vagueness standard tied to a juror's common-sense is a very 
subjective standard and fails to ensure that an objective determination 
can be made as to whether a given aggravating factor exists. Thus, the 
constitutionally mandated narrowing function would not be performed 
in a rationally reviewable manner by an aggravating factor that is only 
required to have a "common-sense core of meaning." Jurors would then 
be permitted to differ as to what is needed to determine that the 
aggravating factor does in fact exist in a particular case. Therefore, the 
use of the "common-sense" standard to determine whether an eligibility 
phase aggravating factor is unconstitutionally vague would inhibit rather 
than ensure that the function of the eligibility phase is performed. 
However, the "common-sense" standard does ensure that the 
sentencing authority is provided with meaningful guidance during the 
selection phase. This is because the determination to be made by the 
sentencing authority during the selection phase is a much more 
subjective determination. Here the sentencing authority is not making 
the objective determination of whether specific aggravating factors exist, 
but instead is making the more subjective determination of whether all 
aspects of the crime and the offender's character warrant sentencing the 
offender to death. 185 This determination is permitted to be a more 
subjective standard. In order to even reach this stage, the offender must 
be convicted of first-degree murder and an aggravating factor that 
genuinely narrows the class of persons eligible for the death penalty 
must have been found by the sentencing authority. Hence, the vagueness 
standard utilized to judge selection phase aggravating factors is not 
184. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (explaining that 
Furman's "basic requirement" is that arbitrary and capricious jury discretion must be 
replaced "with objective standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable 
the process for imposing a sentence of death."); Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428 (stating that 
"[p]art of a State's responsibility in this regard is to define the crimes for which death 
may be the sentence in a way that obviates 'standardless [sentencing] discretion' ... and 
that 'make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death"'). 
185. This is the point in the capital sentencing process where· the distinction 
between a weighing and a non-weighing statute is relevant. Under a weighing statute, 
the .subjective determination the sentencing authority makes at this point must be guided 
by a ''mental balancing" process. See supra note 152. Under a non-weighing statute the 
sentencing authority makes the same subjective determination, but under this paradigm 
the decision is guided by the simple consideration of all evidence in "extenuation, 
mitigation and aggravation.of punishment." See supra note 152. 
This Comment only addresses the applicability of the Court's "common-sense" 
vagueness standard in the context of a weighing jurisdiction because that is the context 
in which that standard was announced in Tuilaepa, namely, California's weighing statute. 
This Comment expresses no opinion on whether that "common-sense" standard is 
applicable in a non-weighing jurisdiction. 
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required to ensure that an aggravating factor is defined in a manner that 
allows the sentencing authority to make an objective determination of 
whether it exists. Instead, the standard must ensure that the sentencing 
authority understands the factors it is directed to consider so that the 
offender is sentenced on an individualized basis as mandated by the 
Constitution. Therefore, it is not only proper but necessary to limit the 
applicability of the "common-sense" standard to the selection phase. To 
do otherwise would allow the fundamental principles of the Court's 
death penalty jurisprudence to be violated. 
Third, it is appropriate to have two distinct vagueness standards 
because the function an aggravating factor performs in each phase 
demands a different level of precision in factor definition. The 
narrowing function the eligibility phase performs requires the aggravat-
ing factors to be defined with a sufficient level of precision so that the 
factors will genuinely narrow the class of persons. eligible for the death 
penalty. The individualized sentencing determination the selection phase 
performs requires the aggravating factors to be defined in terms that the 
sentencing authority is capable of understanding, so that it knows which 
characteristics of the offender and crime to consider in making this 
determination. The eligibility phase inherently requires a higher degree 
of precision in definition of the aggravating factors, and therefore, the 
standard utilized in that phase is necessarily a higher one.186 An 
aggravating factor can be defined in terms that an ordinary juror could 
understand and still not genuinely narrow the class of person eligible for 
the death penalty. Consequently, it is appropriate to require two 
different levels of precision in defining the aggravating factors. 
Fourth, the authority the Court cites only supports this "common-
sense" standard if the standard's applicability is limited to the selection 
phase of the capital sentencing process. The two cases cited by the 
Court for its proposition that this "common-sense" standard is to be used 
to determine whether an aggravating factor is unconstitutionally vague 
were Maynard v. Cartwright and Godfrey v. Georgia.187 However, in 
186. Due to the eligibility phase standard being a higher standard, the selection 
phase standard rarely is considered. This is because a vast majority of the statutes utilize 
the same factors in both the eligibility and selection phases. Thus, once the factors are 
deemed to meet the eligibility phase standard there is no need to consider the selection 
phase standard. 
187. Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2636 (1994). The Court stated that 
it has relied on this "basic principle" when it has found any aggravating factors to be 
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those two cases, the Court did not expressly use this standard to hold the 
challenged aggravating factors unconstitutionally vague. 
Both Maynard and Godfrey held that the challenged factors were 
unconstitutionally vague because they failed to channel the sentencing 
authority's discretion by clear and objective standards, not because they 
lacked a common-sense core of meaning. 188 Arguably, the use of the 
"common-sense" standard would render the factors challenged in 
Maynard and Godfrey unconstitutionally vague.189 However, it is 
simply not the standard utilized by the Court to arrive at that conclusion 
in those cases. In fact, both cases are conspicuously absent any 
reference to Justice White's concurring opinion in Jurek, from which the 
"common-sense" standard is derived.190 The only reference to the 
Court's Jurek decision at all appears buried in a "see also" string cite in 
Godfrey.191 Furthermore, the Court's examination of the challenged 
aggravating factors in Maynard and Godfrey was limited to the eligibility 
stage of sentencing. In Godfrey, the Court held that the challenged 
aggravating factor was invalid because it failed to limit the class of 
murderers eligible for the death penalty at the eligibility phase of capital 
sentencing.192 In Maynard, the Court held that the challenged factor 
was invalid for the identical reason.193 Therefore, in announcing this 
"common-sense" standard, the Tuilaepa Court cites no authority which 
would support the application of this standard to aggravating factors 
utilized in the eligibility phase. However, because Tuilaepa is the first 
unconstitutionally vague. Id. As examples of its use of this "basic principle," the Court 
references Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988), and Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 
U.S. 420 (1980). Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2636. 
188. See Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428 (stating that "[t]here is nothing in these few 
words, standing alone, that implies any inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious 
infliction of the death sentence"); Maynard, 486 U.S. at 363-64 (explaining that "the 
language of the Oklahoma aggravating circumstance at issue .. • . gave no more guidance 
than the ... language" utilized in Godfrey). See also supra notes 108-128 and 
accompanying text. 
189. In Godfrey and Maynard the Court stated that its reason for holding the 
challenged aggravating factors unconstitutional was that the factors failed to adequately 
channel the sentencing authority's discretion. See supra note 188. Although the Court 
did not use the "common-sense" standard in Godfrey and Maynard, the challenged 
factors could be said to lack a "common-sense core of meaning." The Court, however, 
made no reference to this "common-sense" standard in either decision. 
190. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 279 (1976) (White, J., concurring). 
191. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428. 
192. See id. at 433 (holding that "[t]here is no principled way to distinguish this 
case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was 
not"). 
193. See Maynard, 486 U.S. at 364 (concluding that the challenged factor was 
invalid because an ordinary person could honestly believe that said factor applied in 
every murder case). 
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decision by the Court addressing a challenge to aggravating factors used 
solely in the selection phase, the fact that there is no authority to support 
the use of the "common-sense" standard does not preclude its use if it 
is limited strictly to the selection phase. 
Finally, as previous sections of this Comment have indicated, the 
Supreme Court -has already set forth a vagueness standard to evaluate 
aggravating factors that perform the eligibility phase's narrowing 
function. 194 That standard is that an aggravating factor "must channel 
the sentencer's discretion by 'clear and objective standards' that provide 
'specific and detailed guidance."'195 The Court's decisions have 
implicitly limited this standard's applicability to the eligibility phase 
because that is the context in which it was developed and has been the 
only context in which it has been applied.196 This well settled vague-
ness standard is not expressly overruled by the Court's decision in 
Tuilaepa. In fact, it does not even refer to it. Therefore, given this 
context, it is appropriate to limit the "common-sense" standard to the 
selection phase because doing so fills a void highlighted by the Court 
clearly differentiating between the two phases of the capital sentencing 
process; such an interpretation also avoids overruling a well settled 
standard by implication alone. 
Thus, with its decision in Tuilaepa, the Supreme Court clearly 
articulates that there are indeed two stages to the process of sentencing 
an offender to death and that each stage has its own distinct set of 
requirements placed upon aggravating factors. In the eligibility phase, 
an aggravating factor must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible 
for the death penalty. 197 Typically, this requirement is satisfied if the 
sentencing authority is provided with a principled means of distinguish-
ing the cases in which the death penalty is imposed from the many in 
which it is not. 198 In the selection phase, the aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors together must ensure that the offender is sentenced on an 
194. See supra notes 104-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of that 
standard. 
195. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428 (citations omitted); see also supra note 117 and 
accompanying text. 
196. See Godfrey, 428 U.S. 420; Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983); see also 
supra notes 104-36 and accompanying text. 
197. Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2635 (1994). 
198. Zant, 462 U.S. at 876-78. 
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individualized basis. 199 This requirement is satisfied in a weighing 
jurisdiction by requiring the sentencing authority to weigh the aggravat-
ing factors found in the case against the mitigating factors. 
Regardless of the phase in which an aggravating factor is utilized, it 
cannot be unconstitutionally vague. If it is, the factor is likely to lead 
to the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty.200 
After Tuilaepa, each phase of the capital sentencing process has its own 
standard to determine if an aggravating factor utilized is unconstitution-
ally vague. If the aggravating factors utilized in the selection phase of 
sentencing are the same as those utilized in the eligibility phase, then 
only the eligibility phase standard of vagueness needs to be satisfied, 
because the eligibility phase standard is more rigorous than the selection 
phase standard.201 The eligibility phase standard requires that the 
sentencing authority's discretion be channeled by clear and objective 
standards that provide specific and detailed guidance.202 If a different 
set of factors is utilized in the selection phase, as in California, then the 
factors utilized in the selection phase must satisfy the selection phase 
vagueness standard instead of the eligibility phase standard. That 
standard requires that an aggravating factor have some "common-sense 
core of meaning . . . that criminal juries should be capable of under-
standing. "203 Therefore, through its decision in Tuilaepa, the Supreme 
Court implies that the function an aggravating factor is constitutionally 
mandated to perform, as well as the amount of precision the Constitution 
requires in defining it, depends upon the phase of the capital sentencing 
process in which the aggravating factor is utilized. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Comment has traced the evolution of the requirements placed 
upon capital punishment statutes and the manner in which those 
requirements permit the death penalty to be a constitutional form of 
punishment. Central to all of the constitutional capital punishment 
statutes has been the aggravating factor, or something the Supreme Court 
has construed to be its equivalent. Over the past two decades, the Court 
has devoted an immeasurable amount of time to its efforts to clarify the 
requirements the Constitution places upon the use of aggravating factors, 
199. See Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2635. 
200. Id. 
201. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
202. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980). 
203. Tui/aepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2636 (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 279 
(1976) (White, J., concurring)). 
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as well as how aggravating factors permit the death penalty to be 
imposed in a constitutional manner. 
After the "'76 Cases," the simple inclusion of aggravating factors in 
a capital punishment statute virtually ensured its constitutional validity. 
In those cases, the Court endorsed aggravating factors as the preferred 
means to prevent the constitutional deficiencies addressed in Furman v. 
Georgia. In Godfrey v. Georgia the Court ruled that the simple 
inclusion of aggravating factors was no longer sufficient. The Court 
found that if the constitutional deficiencies addressed in Furman· were 
to be adequately addressed, the aggravating factors had to be defined 
with a certain amount of precision. Next, in Zant v. Stephens, the Court 
ruled that defining aggravating factors in a certain manner was no longer 
sufficient. The Court found that aggravating factors must also perform 
a certain function if all of the constitutional concerns regarding the death 
penalty were to be satisfied. Now, in the recent decision of Tuilaepa v. 
California, the Court rules that what is needed to satisfy these two 
requirements depends upon the phase of capital sentencing in which the 
aggravating factors are utilized. 
Thus, the Supreme Court's cases on capital punishment make two 
things clear. First, the appropriate use of aggravating factors will 
guarantee that a capital punishment statute is constitutional. Second, 
what constitutes the appropriate use of aggravating factors is an evolving 
concept allowing the imposition of the death penalty to comport with the 
contemporary societal values used to determine the protection of the 
Eighth Amendment. 
DAVID HESSELTINE 
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